JAPAN 



AND 



THE FAR EAST 
CONFERENCE 



BY 
HENRY W. TAFT 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 




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JAPAN AND 
THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 



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THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

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Japan and the Far East 
Conference 



By ,^.. 
Henry W. Taft 



5fEt» fork 

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
1921 

All rights reserved 



PRINTED IN UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



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Copyright, 1921 
By the MACMILLAN COMPANY 



Set up and printed. Published October, 1921 



FERRIS PRINTING COMPANY 
NEW YORK 

OCT 2l; m\ 

©Ci.A624977 



Preface 

What is contained in this little volume is an ampli- 
fication of articles contributed to the New York Times 
and Current Opinion. By putting the substance of 
these articles in more permanent form I hope to con- 
tribute something towards stimulating thought in this 
country upon the subject of our Far Eastern policy. 
Americans are so preoccupied at home with their diver- 
sified activities that it is not easy to arouse their in- 
terest in foreign affairs; and this is notably so with 
reference to Asia. The approaching conference in 
Washington will afford an opportunity for presenting 
to the American people in an authoritative way con- 
ditions in Far Eastern countries. Presumably the 
facts will be gathered in a comprehensive and scien- 
tific manner and there will be collated for the guidance 
of the participants in the conference, valuable data con- 
cerning the social, ethnological, political, economic and 
industrial conditions in the Oriental countries, and par- 
ticularly in China and Japan. Whatever may be the 
definitive results of the conference, such an investiga- 
tion ought to do much to stabilize our Far Eastern 
policy ; and it must inevitably advance the interests of 

mankind. 

H. W. T. 

October 10, 1921. 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Japan's Attitude --- - - - - 7 

A Look Forward — General - - - - - 14 

The Dominance of Japan in the East - - - 19 

China's Position in the East - - - - 21 

Japan's Progress as a Modern Nation - - - 27 

Misunderstanding of the Japanese - - - 34 

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement _ - _ - 41 

Japan's Imperialism ------ 44 

Our Interest in Dealing With Far East Questions 48 

Immigration and the California Land Question - 51 
Shantung --------62 

The Improbability of War - - - - - 7^ 

Necessity for Territorial Expansion - - - 74 



JAPAN'S ATTITUDE 

The foreign policy of the United States with refer- 
ence to Oriental matters must in the last analysis 
depend upon our relations with Japan. If Japan had 
grown to be a world power before America and the 
European powers had acquired "spheres of influence" 
on the Asiatic continent she might have established an 
effective Monroe Doctrine for the Orient, declaring 
that attempts to impair the territorial integrity or to 
disturb the political institutions of China or any other 
Asiatic nation, would be regarded as an unfriendly act. 
But Japan emerged too late from the condition of a 
hermit nation, and remained too long subject to Samurai 
traditions and militaristic influences, to justify her in 
asserting, as the United States asserted with reference 
to the American continent, that the extension in Asia 
of European systems would constitute a menace to her 
national life and her governmental institutions. Be- 
fore her military strength had been demonstrated by 
the Chinese and Russian wars and before her political 
system had begun to assume the character of a modern 
representative government, England, France, Russia 
and the United States had acquired interests in the Far 
East which made them factors which could not be ex- 

7 



8 JAPAN AND THE PAR EAST CONFERENCE 

eluded by the delayed assertion or the temporary accept- 
ance of such an imperfect imitation of the Monroe 
Doctrine as the Lansing-Ishii agreement. And so it 
happens that no great international policy can be in- 
augurated in the Far East without taking account of 
the interests of the western nations I have mentioned, 
although, for obvious reasons, Russia's assumption of 
the role of an International Pariah must exclude her 
from present calculations. But it is equally true that 
so far as the potentiality of strictly Asiatic nations is 
concerned there is none of them except Japan that need 
be considered in establishing international equilibrium. 
A settlement with Japan of Far East and Pacific ques- 
tions means to all intents and purposes a settlement of 
the destinies of all the peoples of the Orient, although, 
perhaps, this generalization ought to be qualified by 
the statement that such a settlement cannot be perman- 
ent if it does not make just provision for the welfare 
and the free development of the vast populations that 
inhabit the Asiatic continent, however impotent they 
may be in the national and military sense. 

It is this dominant position of Japan in the East 
that makes the International Conference recently called 
by President Harding of historical importance. 
Whether or not we diff^er with the statement of the 
State Department, made by direction of the President, 
that "limitation of armaments," the primary purpose 



JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 9 

of the conference, "has a close relation to the Pacific 
and Far Eastern problems," those who believe that a 
better understanding of Far Eastern questions as a 
basis for a more satisfactory international status than 
now exists is necessary, will rejoice that at last we are 
seriously to undertake "the consideration of all matters 
bearing upon their (i. e., Far Eastern problems) solu- 
tion, with a view to reaching a common understanding 
with respect to principles and policy in the Far East." 
(Statement of the State Department). 

It is, of course, right that China should be invited 
"to take part in the discussion relating to Far Eastern 
questions." But representations by the present Peking 
government can hardly have much weight in view of 
its insignificance as a political agency. Indeed, one of 
the chief difficulties the conference will encounter in 
dealing with Chinese affairs, will be that the Peking 
government, politically speaking, is not representative 
of the Chinese people and remains in nominal power 
solely through the tolerance of military governors of 
the provinces who are content to have a "show" govern- 
mental establishment in Peking while they enjoy real 
power as rulers of the people. In view of this situation 
it is not surprising that the Constitutionahst Govern- 
ment at Canton, a revolutionary organization, accord- 
ing to our ideas of government, headed by Dr. Sun Yat 
Sen, has instructed its representative in Washington 



10 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 

to inform the American Government that the Peking 
government is no longer capable of representing China 
and that it is not qualified to send a delegate to the 
conference, but that the South China government should 
be represented. In support of its claims it further 
continues to assert that the Peking government is 
bankrupt and politically deserted and that the Chinese 
people are demanding that its recognition as the gov- 
ernment of the nations be withdrawn by foreign nations. 

One who has discussed Far East questions with 
leaders of thought and statesmen in Japan (particu- 
larly in the Japanese environment) will not be surprised 
at the initial hesitation of the Japanese government to 
join the conference without some definition of the sub- 
jects and scope of the proposed discussions. This is due 
to a caution or reserve in dealing with international 
affairs, attributable to causes which I will refer to later. 
But I am satisfied that it will yield to the logic of the 
situation and that when the conference shall have ended 
there will be no basis for reasonable complaint that 
Japan has not at least discussed freely all Far East 
and Pacific questions, even though she may by her veto 
prevent what she regards as definitive action detri- 
mental to her sovereign rights or an offense to her 
national dignity. 

I remember that in a six day conference in which I 
participated in Tokio in 1920, with leading Japanese 



JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 11 

publicists, statesmen, journalists and financiers, a sug- 
gestion that Shantung be made a part of the agenda 
was met with the objection that there was no Shantung 
question ; — that it was a fait accompli by virtue of the 
Versailles Treaty. But the objection quickly yielded to 
the suggestion that as the conference was designed 
principally to improve relations between the two coun- 
tries, and as the people of the United States believed 
that there was a Shantung question, an omission to dis- 
cuss it would be unfortunate. And I hope that similar 
counsels will prevail in the Far East Conference. 
Underlying some of these questions is the principle 
already asserted by Mr. Hughes in his Yap communi- 
cation, viz: that as one of the allied and associated 
powers, a disposition of territory or rights acquired 
as a result of the war, cannot be made without our 
consent, and especially where, as in the case of Yap, 
the territory can reasonably be regarded as within the 
range of our influence as a Pacific power. This princ- 
iple affects, in a lesser degree, the Shantung question, 
although our primary interest there relates to the "open 
door" in China, while a secondary consideration is 
based on our adherence to the principle that helpless 
China should not be despoiled of her territory. But as 
I shall show later, Japan ought to welcome an oppor- 
tunity for settling the Shantung question in some 
authoritative way. She has repeatedly evinced to the 



J 



12 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 

Chinese government a desire to negotiate a settlement, 
but has, as yet, succeeded in getting no definite response. 
A discussion in the conference and an understanding 
by the conferring nations will no doubt lead to a solu- 
tion which will be to Japan's advantage without any 
impairment of her sovereignty, particularly as she 
starts with the enormous advantage of an award under 
the Versailles Treaty, assented to by England, France, 
Italy and Germany, of all Germany's rights in Kiao 
Chow and the Shantung Peninsula. 

There is a line, however, beyond which Japan's 
national rights and dignity will not permit her to go. 
Thus she will be justified in refusing to discuss Korea 
or Formosa. Both these territories have become con- 
stituent parts of the Japanese Empire, and the fact 
that there may be disturbances in parts of Korea, and 
even among some Koreans aspirations for independ- 
ence, these are clearly domestic questions which Japan 
will decline to discuss. 

To a suggestion that Shantung should be discussed, 
some Japanese newspapers have "countered" by sug- 
gesting that the California land laws and immigration 
in general should be discussed. Again the matter of 
racial equality has also been brought up. But Japan 
will not seriously contend in the conference or elsewhere 
that the United States, for the protection of its own 
people, may not absolutely exclude Oriental races, or 



JAPAN AND THE FAB, EAST CONFERENCE IS 

that discrimination may not be made against those 
races in laws establishing qualifications for citizenship. 
Japan herself is forced to adopt an exclusion policy 
against China. These are so clearly matters affecting 
Japan and the United States alone that I doubt 
whether a way will be found for even their discussion 
at a conference seeking to reach a "common under- 
standing with respect to principles and policy in the 
Far East." It would be unwise for Japan again to 
press the subject of "racial equality." It would surely 
meet the same fate as at Versailles and a solution of 
the insoluble question would be just as far away as 
possible. 

The prospective conference makes it timely to con- 
sider a variety of Oriental questions of interest to 
America and Japan. 



A LOOK FORWARDS-GENERAL 

Social, industrial and political developments among 
the vast populations of the Far East foreshadow an 
epoch of world wide importance. The historian of the 
future will become increasingly occupied in interpret- 
ing the changing phases of the process by which the 
new order will be super-imposed upon and will sub- 
merge the old. Will a culture emerge based upon the 
model of Western or Christian civilization, or will there 
be a recrudescence of the wonderful systems which 
existed in India and China thousands of years ago.^^ 
Is there anything in the recent trend of history which 
suggests an answer to this question .? We of the Occi- 
dental races believe that the civilization which has grown 
up during the Christian era has brought the human 
race to the most advanced stage of development record- 
ed in history. What we call Western civilization has 
thrived in its most perfect flower upon the continent of 
Europe; but it is now staggering under the grievous 
wounds inflicted by the great war, if, indeed, it had not 
before that cataclysm shown signs of decay; and if 
we could conceive of Europe completely detached from 
the rest of the world, it would require no great pro- 
phetic power to predict an end of its once perfect cul- 

14 



JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 15 

ture. While she is tottering to her feet, it is fairly 
clear that the process of disintegration can be stayed 
only by the moral, material and political support anc' 
inspiration received from America. 

The people of the United States have not advanced 
in culture to the highest point heretofore reached by 
the European nations ; — but we have gone far. And 
while in the development of our political institutions 
for the creation and preservation of those rights and 
privileges connoted under the term of civil liberty, with 
their reciprocal obligations, and in the cultivation of 
the moral and intellectual qualities of our people, we 
have made a notable advance and have furnished models 
for the rest of the world, our national consciousness is 
still lacking in some of those things which develop only 
in maturity and under the influence of traditions cen- 
turies old. We have the loftiest aspirations and the 
highest ideals. In the value of our resources we are 
the richest, in the vigor, inventiveness, resourcefulness 
and potentiality of our people we are the most power- 
ful, from the disinterestedness of our idealism we are 
the most influential, and in our conception of the bless- 
ings of representative institutions we are the most 
advanced, nation of the world. And while we have not 
reached the stage of development in some directions 
attained by the older European nations, it is in Amer- 
ica that Christian civilization is sometime to reach its 



16 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 

farthest point of advance ; and when it does, the inevit- 
able swing of its influence will be to the west and will 
affect the myriads of people of the Orient. 

Bishop Berkeley's beautiful and prophetic words of 
two hundred years ago may yet find application in the 
Far East : 

There shall be sung another golden age, 
The rise of empire and of arts, 
The good and great inspiring epic rage, 
The wisest heads and noblest hearts. 

Not such as Europe breeds in her decay ; 
Such as she bred when fresh and young, 
When heavenly flame did animate her clay. 
By future poets shall be sung. 

Westward the course of empire takes its way ; 
The first four acts already past, 
Al fifth shall close the Drama with the Day : 
Time's noblest offspring is the last. 

And who can say that empire shall not continue its 
course beyond the point where in mid-Pacific the west 
becomes the east, and shall not awaken the five hundred 
millions of people in Northern Asia to "another golden 
age" ? 



JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 17 

Historically, it is of entrancing interest to dwell upon 
the amazing development centuries before the Christian 
era of civilization in the countries of the Orient. We 
gaze upon it with wonder and admiration. After its 
own model it did not fall short of the perfection 
achieved later by western nations in their cultural 
development. But it has long been evident that under 
modern conditions the outworn customs and pursuits 
of ancient days are placing fetters upon the Oriental 
nations which have forced them to look to the west to 
save themselves from utter decadence of their national 
life. Oriental civilization in the historical sense is 
doomed. Its institutions cannot be rehabilitated. It 
must be superseded by some form of civilization based 
upon the institutions of the western nations. Philo- 
sophers and statesmen of the Orient have long been 
conscious that this development was inevitable. 

What does this mean for the United States? 

The cable, the wireless and the fast steamship service 
have made communication with Asia easier than among 
the original thirteen states when the Union was created. 
Our two thousand miles of western sea-coast fronts 
that of Asia with a barrier easily overcome by the 
devices of modern arts and sciences. Commercial inter- 
dependence has already assumed vast proportions. 
Asiatic nations are not seeking to impose upon us Orien- 
tal ideas and customs but, on the contrary, they are con- 



18 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONlFERENCEi 

sciously submitting themselves to the influences of 
western civiHzation, all for the purpose of adapting our 
institutions to their national needs and implanting them 
in the Orient. The march of progress will in the course 
of centuries bring the nations of the East into the fam- 
ily of those nations whose inspiration and national con- 
sciousness is founded in the principles of western Chris- 
tian civilization. 



THE DOMINANCE OF JAPAN IN THE EAST 

Nearly one thousand millions of people live in India, 
Japan, China and the other countries of Eastern Asia. 
A deterioration of their national character without the 
substitution of the stabilizing elements of the institu- 
tions of our western civilization, would be a calamity. 
The Japanese are the only Oriental people that have 
the prospect in the near future of creating a progres- 
sive self-governing state. India and the other British 
possesions in the East, the Dutch Islands, the Philip- 
pines, China, Manchuria, Mongolia, Siberia, with their 
vast aggregate population, are subject nations. The 
art of self-government has made little progress among 
them, and their people are in a backward state of 
development. Hundreds of millions of people in India 
are held together and saved from probable anarchy by 
the helpful control of Western powers; but the East 
Indians are dependent races, even though they are en- 
joying some of the benefits of Western civilization, and 
are being saved imder the British rule from civil strife, 
and probably from greater desolation by famine and 
pestilence. The Philippines, if we were to release our 
hold upon them, would drift no man knows whither. 
The conditions in Siberia are little better than anarchy. 

19 



20 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONIFERENCE 

China as a unified nation, on the model of the modern 
state, does not exist. Japan alone of the Oriental 
nations maintains a government representative of her 
people and is pursuing the arts of civilization under its 
effective protection. It is a serious question for the 
people of the United States to ponder, and the coming 
International Conference will afford a fortunate oppor- 
tunity for considering, whether, with our ideas of the 
advantages of self-government, of industrial progress, 
of law and order and of international responsibility, 
we ought to assume to interpose obstacles to Japanese 
activities in the East which are made necessary by 
Japan's natural and economic and industrial growth 
and the demands of her people for food, raw materials 
and the opportunities for self-support. The question 
cannot be disposed of by broad and dogmatic denuncia- 
tion of Japan's imperialistic and militaristic tendencies. 
We must, in our own interest, and the Conference 
should in the wider interests of modern civilization, give 
to these subjects the attention and expend upon them 
the sympathy which their enormous importance de- 
mands. 



CHINA'S POSITION IN THE EAST 

Much is said about China as the ultimate hope of 
the East; and many who justly admire the moral and 
intellectual qualities of individual Chinamen, particu- 
larly those of the educated classes, are always ready 
to protest against any action on the part of Japan 
which savors of an attempt at aggrandizement at the 
expense of China. But China has not yet become in 
the modern sense an autonomous state. 

In spite of the extraordinary development among 
her intelligent classes of a national consciousness, the 
Chinese nation is impotent single-handed to resist ex- 
ternal pressure tending to impair its territorial integ- 
rity and its national sovereignty. Since it has become 
a republic and has abandoned many anachronisms in 
her social, economic and political life, such as the out- 
worn practice of requiring erudite classical knowledge 
as a qualification for public office, great progress has 
been made, if not in administration, at least in a recog- 
nition of the necessity for adopting methods prevailing 
in other countries of the world in education, economics 
and government. Every observant Westerner who 
visits China is impressed by the enthusiasm and high 
intelligence of the educated classes, and particularly 

21 



2^ JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONIFERENCE 

of the bodies of students, who appear to be among the 
principal leaders in the movement for the moral, econo- 
mic and political regeneration of their country. If 
these classes of men and women of modern China were 
representative of its population of four hundred mil- 
lions, the chance of creating a unified national spirit 
and introducing into the psychology of the great 
masses of the people the concept of patriotism and 
nationality which exists in a high degree in western 
nations, the outlook would be indeed encouraging. 

But how long is this going to take? 

The spirit of modern progress has not permeated 
more than a very small percentage of the Chinese pop- 
ulation. The great mass of the people in the inland 
cities, the small villages and the agricultural districts, 
have neither knowledge of nor interest in measures 
which are being contemplated for their benefit by the 
small minority of their fellow countrymen. They are 
pursuing their daily tasks and are living their daily 
lives much as they have for centuries. Furthermore, 
while some effort is being made to introduce education, 
the common people are generally illiterate, the contrast 
in that respect with the same class in Japan being very 
marked. The government of the Chinese people in 
the smaller communities continues to be largely patri- 
archal and their loyalty to constituted authority does 
not extend higher than the Provincial Governgr. A 



JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 23 

national federated government and the duties of nation- 
al citizenship continue to be far beyond the contempla- 
tion of the great mass of the Chinese people. A signi- 
ficant evidence of this is the difficulty which any central 
government finds in attempting to enforce a system 
of taxation which will produce an amount adequate for 
its support. A nation of four hundred millions of 
inhabitants with a country having resources of fabul- 
ous richness, is constantly forced to make loans for the 
payment of the expenses of the quite limited adminis- 
trative activities of its central government! All sorts 
of reasons will be adduced for this, but the fact will still 
remain that whether through dishonesty or inefficiency 
or national impotence, the Peking government finds the 
utmost difficulty in keeping itself a going concern. 

The government of Southern China has for some 
time been practically independent of the Peking gov- 
ernment, although there is now no open rebellion. 
Southern China manages its own affairs, and the Peking 
government tolerates the situation because it is power- 
less to alter it. It is a well-known fact that most of 
the military governments, presided over by veritable 
satraps, have usurped power in the several provinces 
and maintain a sort of a feudal governmental estab- 
lishment, paying little heed to either the central govern- 
ment or the other provinces. The humiliating impot- 
ence of the Peking government was lately exhibited 



24 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONtFERENCE 

when it refused even to open negotiations with Japan 
concerning the Shantung question, because it could not 
undertake to make any binding agreement which it 
could be assured would meet with the approval of the 
Chinese people. 

A; well-informed writer, H. H. Powers, S. B., Ph. D., 
American educationist and author, who has visited 
China six times, has summed up the situation in China, 
with a generalization probably too sweeping, by say- 
ing that the trouble with the present government 
of China is that it is too representative of the Chinese 
people, because it reflects too truly their political mor- 
ality and their political capacity. He adds that "their 
disloyalty reflects the rudimentary political conscious- 
ness of the Chinese, with whom loyalty has hardly yet 
transcended the limits of the clan. . . . Their dis- 
sensions are representative of the incoherence of China, 
which has never known a real political unit beyond that 
of the province. . . . The hands-off policy will 
keep China what it has made her, a flabby colossus that 
staggers under its own weight and whines at the pinch 
of a school boy." 

While these statements will probably be vigorously 
combatted by those who have been thrown into contact 
with the best type of the modern educated Chinaman, 
the best friends of China will not deny that the mass 
of the Chinese people do not now, and cannot for many 



JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 25 

jears, connect the idea of government with any organ- 
ization beyond the province, and that their psychology 
does not include the idea of a modern unified, consoli- 
dated, federated nation. 

Many people who have come in contact with the pro- 
gressive element in China, that is, those of the Intel- 
ligencia class, derive from them the belief that if that 
nation is protected against Japan's aggressiveness, it 
will be able within some short time to bring about such 
reforms in its internal affairs, and to create such a 
national solidarity, as to establish itself as one of the 
powerful nations of the earth. But if this does not 
happen within the next generation, it seems probable 
that, in the natural development in Asiatic affairs, 
Japanese power, and her economic and industrial devel- 
opment on the mainland, will make inroads on the sov- 
ereignty of China as a result of which the nation may 
be resolved into units which can each sustain itself more 
effectively than the congeries of provinces now nomin- 
ally constituting China. 

The building of the Chinese people into an autonom- 
ous, self-sustaining, independent nation, by educating 
the mass of her people not only to make them to some 
extent literate, but also to inculcate an idea of attach- 
ment to their country as a whole and of the perform- 
ance of the duties of citizenship, is a task which will 
occupy generations. In the meantime, China will re- 



26 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONtFERENCE 

main In a very real sense the ward of the family of 
civilized nations and cannot be expected to take an 
effective initiative in advancing the cause of civiliza- 
tion in the East. The Conference cannot fairly con- 
sider the so-called Far Eastern question without draw- 
ing a contrast between the situation of China and that 
of Japan. 



JAPAN'S PROGRESS AS A MODERN NATION 

In the last three-quarters of a century Japan has 
developed upon the lines of western civilization in an 
amazing fashion. In educating her people, in the de- 
velopment of her agriculture and industries, and in her 
economic and commercial interests, Japan has pro- 
gressed with a rapidity and prosperity having no paral- 
lel in modern history. Furthermore, her national con- 
sciousness has so developed and the patriotism of her 
people has been so concentrated that the solidarity of 
her people is not equalled by any other country in the 
world except possibly France. In the energy and pro- 
gressiveness of her people, in the vision of her states- 
men, in the aspirations of her people for the better- 
ment of their intellectual and material condition; in 
short, in all of the activities, moral, mental and physi- 
cal, which we regard as necessary for the development 
of a modern state, Japan among the nations of the 
East is in a class by itself. 

Gradually but surely she is becoming a representa- 
tive democratic nation. The manhood franchise has 
been extended and the demand for universal suffrage 
is being constantly pressed. The interest of the people 
in public affairs is manifested at great public meet- 

27 



^8 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONIFERENCE 

ings. Newspapers are numerous and are no less alert 
in keeping track of public affairs than the American 
press. In one of the great cities of Japan I witnessed 
at many bulletin boards an exhibition of the interest 
of the people in the returns the day after the election 
to the Diet. A growing liberal party is gradually but 
certainly increasing its hold upon the masses. The 
human material upon which it is working is far from 
being buried in ignorance, for the percentage of liter- 
acy among the Japanese is higher even than it is in 
this country. The compulsory education law is en- 
forced rigorously, with the result that the attendance 
in the schools of those within the school age is general. 
While in some of the districts remote from the great 
centers of population the instruction of the poorer 
classes is not such as to give them more than a limited 
knowledge of reading and writing, there is, neverthe- 
less, a great body of the common people who have suf- 
ficient knowledge to inform themselves by reading the 
newspapers, which they do with the most assiduous 
attention. There is thus in the making in Japan the 
kind of public opinion that we deem essential to secure 
civil liberty, and it is steadily and progressively influ- 
encing governmental action. The trend is towards a 
popular democratic government. 

It is unfortunately the fact that the ministers of 
war and of the navy are not removable upon the change 



JAPAN AND THE. FAU EAST CONFEEENCE 29 

of the political administration. Thus military affairs 
are not dependent upon departments in charge of civil 
administration and as a result are to some extent re- 
moved from the restraints of public opinion. But it 
is generally recognized that the influences working 
within the country itself and a regard for the opinion 
of other nations of the world, are gradually evolving 
a liberal policy which is tending to curb the imperial- 
istic tendency which has been dominant under the mil- 
itaristic system. Even leaders of the military party 
are themselves convinced that an imperialistic policy 
must be pursued, if at all, with much more circum- 
spection than has heretofore been regarded as neces- 
sary. Japan asserts that her policy on the Asiatic 
continent and particularly in China has been dictated 
by a wise prevision of the future necessities of her 
people; and there is no doubt that her contention is 
not without considerable foundation. 

But Japan's aggressive militarism has subjected her 
to the suspicion of entertaining imperialistic designs 
involving the impairment of the sovereignty of China, 
Mongolia, Manchuria and Siberia. Her administra- 
tion of recently acquired territory, particularly Korea, 
has brought upon her severe criticism. Her tardiness 
in withdrawing her troops from Siberia, Manchuria, 
Mongolia and the Shantung Peninsula have been espec- 
ially pointed to as evidence that she proposed to extend 



30 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 

her hegemony over these countries. There is much evi- 
dence of her effort to monopolize Oriental trade, some- 
times by questionable means, and many people claim 
that she is a menace to the policy of the open door 
in China. Instances of oppressive practices by the 
Japanese upon the Asiatic continent, made effective by 
the support given to them by military forces, are num- 
erous. One of the commonest charges made against 
Japan is that her agents have corrupted Chinese gov- 
ernment officials and have by sinister means fomented 
disturbances with pre-concerted designs against China's 
sovereignty, or at least to prevent her from acquiring 
a national solidarity which would be a menace to 
Japan's supremacy. 

There is no doubt truth in some of these charges. 
But it is difficult to determine how far these Japanese 
activities have been due to mere mistaken party policy 
and to what extent to a prevailing spirit of imperial- 
ism. Intelligent Japanese do not hesitate to admit that 
mistakes have been made, nor can anyone who has visit- 
ed Japan fail to perceive that the imperialistic tenden- 
cies of the military party are still potent and that they 
account for some of the aggressive enterprises on the 
Asiatic continent. 

Encroachments by the military power of even the 
most advanced nations in occupied alien territory are 
to be expected. The military history of Japan and the 



JAPAN AND THE, FAR EAST CONFERENCE 31 

long-maintained predominance of the military spirit 
in its government, not yet ended, prepare us to believe 
that whatever may be the policy of the civil adminis- 
tration at home, there may be ground for charges of 
military encroachments abroad; and we will no doubt 
continue to hear that Japan has an ulterior design to 
establish an effective hegemony over the Asiatic con- 
tinent. 

But the military party exerts its power with more 
regard for the views of other nations, and with a real- 
ization, perhaps subconscious, that imperialistic mili- 
tarism, upon the model adopted in Germany^ cannot 
long endure. The elder statesmen in Japan not only 
realize this but their views with reference to the pres- 
ent and future relations between Japan and this coun- 
try were sensibly affected during the late war by the 
actual and potential military power of the United 
States. These conditions are working to make the 
chance of war between the two countries extremely re- 
mote, in spite of the irritation recently caused by the 
California land situation. As the Japanese people are 
proud and very sensitive, and as they are easily moved 
to resentment where their national honor is involved, 
a situation might arise where a government in power 
might, against their better judgment, be forced by the 
people to assume a truculent attitude ; but recent events 
have rendered this more and more improbable. 



3£ JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 

In. connection with all these activities of the Japan- 
ese, it must be remembered that Japan is an enlight- 
ened and civilized modern nation; and that her states- 
m.en of all parties feel the responsibility for adequate- 
ly caring for the interests of her citizens, both in the 
matter of providing for their creature comforts and 
also for their enlightenment and training in the duties of 
citizenship. Japan does not and cannot produce enough 
to feed her people. She is without the raw materials 
to maintain her industries. Her population is increas- 
ing at the rate of from 600,000 to 700,000 annually. 
Her circumscribed islands are overcrowded and the re- 
stricted area of agricultural land compels the Japanese 
to adopt methods of cultivation not equaled in their in- 
tensive character in any other part of the world. The 
people on her islands already number 376 to the 
square mile, indicating a density exceeded only in 
Belgium and Holland. Agricultural Japan is one 
continuous truck garden, and waste land which is 
capable of being developed for agriculture is rarer 
than in almost any other country of the world. Of 
the entire land area of Japan only 30% is arable, 
while about 65% is mountainous or swampy, or un- 
available on account of the climate for agricultural 
purposes. If there are sixty millions of Japanese in 
Japan their existence would have to be dependent upon 
the cultivation of 44,000 square miles, or one-fourth 



JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE Oii 

of an acre per capita. To provide food for her popu- 
lation and raw materials for her industries, it is abso- 
lutely essential that Japan should extend her indus- 
trial activities to the Asiatic continent. The fact may 
as well be looked at candidly by the coming conference 
and that cannot be done without a study of Japan's 
real necessities and an endeavor to deal with them 
sympathetically. Opposition to Japan based upon in- 
sensate prejudice or condemnation of her methods as 
being based solely upon her militaristic and imperial- 
istic designs will not bring a solution of the problem. 
If the United States and other Western powers refuse 
to recognize Japan's needs because they wish to main- 
tain for some indefinite period China's national integ- 
rity, territorial and political, they will force Japan to 
adopt a policy which would be by no means agreeable 
to them. 



MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE JAPANESE 

I cannot help attributing some of the charges 
against the Japanese, particularly where they affect 
their responsible statesmen, first, to a national self- 
sufficiency, which is perhaps not unnatural in view of 
the recent military and industrial history of Japan, 
resulting in a reserve which causes them to react rather 
tardily to a new situation in international diplomacy; 
and second, to a temperamental caution. I would not 
attribute to them that quality of inscrutable mental- 
ity popularly called the Oriental Mind, for I do not 
think such a thing exists. Most of us who have dealt 
with Oriental questions spasmodically and indolently, 
have found the assumption that such a mind exists con- 
venient in explaining international episodes which we 
have had neither the inclination nor the facilities for 
thoroughly Investigating. A closer acquaintance with 
Oriental people, however, has led me to the conclusion 
that their mental processes are not essentially different 
from ours. It is true, of course, that their viewpoint 
is affected by national customs, religion, historical tra- 
ditions, inadequate knowledge of conditions existing in 
distant parts of the earth, and, more than all of these, 

34 



JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 65 

by the difference in the language. The difficulty in the 
Japanese in conveying ideas is fraught with much great- 
er danger of misunderstanding than is incident to inter- 
course with nations whose language, being more nearly 
allied to ours, can be much more readily acquired than 
the bewildering Chinese ideographs, and the complicated 
Japanese language which is largely based upon them. 
Assuming that the Oriental way of looking at things 
is due to these conditions, it makes it desirable, if we 
would avoid international misunderstandings, that we 
should make a special effort to overcome the difficulties 
in the way of complete mutual understanding. 

I have found Mr. Kumasaki, the Consul General of 
Japan in New York, a ver^^ candid observer of the 
causes of our misunderstanding of his countrymen. He 
recently wrote to the New York Tribune as follows : 

"My suggestion is, Japan will be better understood 
when she is looked upon as a nation of ordinary human 
beings animated by the same motives and aspirations 
as all the rest of humanity. Japan may differ in many 
ways from the countries of Europe, or those of Amer- 
ica, but the Japanese people in their essential human 
qualities do not differ a particle from the Americans 
or any other people. 

"Vievfed in this light, there is nothing strange or 
mysterious about the Japanese. The history of the 
nation during the last half century shows how closely 



36 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CON|FERENCE 

her behavior approximates those of the western 
nations. 

"Japan for over two centuries preceding 1854, 
when the country was opened to foreign intercourse, 
had been a hermit nation. She had kept her peace and 
troubled nobody. There was not a single war, internal 
or external. The Japanese is rightfully proud of such 
a long period of peace as has never been experienced 
by modern nations of the world. 

"But once having been forced to enter the arena of 
international competition, Japan equipped herself with 
the best available weapons of modern civilization for 
survival. She had to fight several wars. It was the 
instinct of self-preservation that compelled her to fight 
them and her moral and physical superiority that en- 
abled her to win them. 

"In order to make clear the true position of Japan 
let me call your attention to Japan's role in the Far 
East as its stabilizer and as the leader of liberalism in 
those regions. This is often overlooked, perhaps, be- 
cause it is so obvious. 

"First look at the map of the Far East. If you 
eliminate Japan from it how much will there be left 
in the shape of law and order, prosperity and progress, 
in that quarter of the globe.? The history of the last 
century in those regions is nothing but a record of 
aggression and spoliation of the weak peoples by strong 



JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 37 

powers from Europe. Japan's presence as a well or- 
dered and adequately defended nation, vitally interest- 
ed in the maintenance of peace among her neighbors, 
has served undoubtedly as a check to wholesale exploi- 
tation. Unfortunately unrest and civil turmoil exist 
in certain parts of the Orient to-day. But suppose 
there were no Japan, such as she is, and that she were 
a part of the spoils to be divided up, what would have 
been the chaos ! 

"Japan is conscious of her important role. She is 
conscious of the immense difficulties of her task. She 
welcomes heartily the support and cooperation in other 
great powers in maintaining peace and order in the 
Orient. It is for her own good and for the good 
of all. 

"Secondly, Japan is the leader of liberalism in the 
Orient. The Japanese constitution was promulgated 
in 1889. During the following thirty odd years the 
nation has been developing steadily along the lines of 
representative democratic government. The big merit 
of the Japanese progress is its evolutionary, rather 
than revolutionary, character. We have moved stead- 
ily and unfalteringly forward, adjusting our affairs to 
the needs of changing times. 

"With the termination of the great war a phenomenal 
change is coming over the Japanese nation. A keen 
desire to catch up with the most advanced of nations 



88 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 

is evinced in various new movements among the Japan- 
ese people. 

"If you think that the Japanese are all of One mind 
you are badly mistaken. The Japanese differ among 
themselves in ideas and beliefs as much as they do in 
their physiognomy. There are reactionaries and con- 
servatives as well as liberals and radicals. And with 
the ever growing freedom of speech and press all ques- 
tions, social and political and economic, are being dis- 
cussed all over the country." 

I have not seen anything recently wliich seems to me 
to sum up so correctly as Mr. Kumasaki's statement, 
the position of Japan and the Japanese people. 

The self-sufficiency of the Japanese, to which I have 
referred above, was illustrated in Paris in relation to 
the Shantung matter. They rested on what they re- 
garded as the merits of their case, while the Chinese 
delegates took pains through effective propaganda to 
excite the sympathy of the world in their contentions, 
— and succeeded. The caution of the Japanese is prob- 
ably due in part to the brief period of their association 
in international relations with the other nations and in 
part to domestic political influences ; perhaps also to the 
treatment they have received at the hands of the powers 
in the past, notably in the case of Port Arthur. 

But whatever the cause, it does not seem to me that 
Japanese statesmen excel in those arts of diplomacy 



JAPAN AND THE FAK, EAST CONFERENCE 39 

which conciliate and organize pubhc opinion in foreign 
countries ; — and to that fact may be attributed a part 
at least of the prejudice and suspicion which has been 
aroused concerning some of their activities. 

Leaders of thought in Japan do not hesitate to admit 
that Japan has made mistakes, particularly when they 
speak of acts for which political opponents are respon- 
sible ; for internal politics plays a large part in Japan 
even in matters affecting international relations. But 
such apologists generally add that mistakes are to be 
expected in the conduct of the affairs of a nation which 
has been developing its modern civilization for only 
three-quarters of a century. Upon many matters, how- 
ever, the Japanese with some insistence claim that the 
rest of the world has been misled through an inadequate 
understanding of the facts and of the Oriental environ- 
ment. They are tolerant of differences of opinion con- 
cerning their national policy, and are more than willing 
to disclose what they claim to be the facts; but they 
are extremely sensitive when action by other nations, 
and particularly by America, is predicated upon a sup- 
posed inferiority of their race; and when one has seen 
the remarkable development in the economic and indus- 
trial life of Japan, the solidarity with which the Japan- 
ese people pursue their national aspirations, the effec- 
tive manner in which they are cultivating the modern 
arts of civilization, and the importance which they at- 



40 JAPAN AND THE EAR EAST CONEERENCE 

tach to universal education of the people, one is not 
surprised that the people of Japan expect to be ranked 
as among the nations of the earth who have reached the 
highest point of civilization, precisely as they are now 
recognized as one of the powers of the world. 



THE: LANSING-ISHU AGREEMENT 

By the Lansing-Ishii agreement, the Wilson admin- 
istration recognized that propinquity and political in- 
terest justified Japan in claiming that she had a pecu- 
liar relation to all Asiatic matters. Certainly, so long 
as that agreement continues to be a formulation of our 
policy in relation to Oriental matters, we cannot object 
to Japan seeking economic advantages on the Asiatic 
continent. Furthermore, the agreement puts America 
in a situation where it can do much; for her friendly 
intervention will be of enormous influence in Japan ; and 
in the approaching conference she would perform a 
world service by not permitting pressure in behalf of 
China to result in restrictions upon Japan which that 
country would seriously resent. 

But Secretary Lansing informed the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations that the policy declared in 
the agreement was to continue only so long as the Presi- 
dent and the State Department should determine. Fur- 
thermore, it is evident that Japan has had an under- 
standing of the eff'ect of the agreement quite different 
from that entertained by Mr. Lansing and this country 
generally. We have understood the agreement as imply- 
ing nothing more than the open door, while Japan's 

41 



42 JAPAN AND THE FAE EAST CONFERENCE 

statesmen and her press have Interpreted it as a recog- 
nition of the dominant political power of Japan upon 
the Asiatic continent. And now it is clear that Mr. Hard- 
ing's administration is proposing to put an interpreta- 
tion on the Lansing-Ishii agreement which, while it will 
insure the open door in China, will withhold recognition 
of political power. Mr. Hughes has recently written 
to the Chinese Minister as follows : 

"The Government of the United States has never asso- 
ciated itself with any arrangement which sought to 
establish any special rights or privileges in China which 
would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of 
other friendly States ; and I am happy to assure you 
that it is the purpose of this Government neither to 
participate nor to acquiesce in any arrangement which 
might purport to establish in favor of foreign inter- 
ests any superiority of rights with respect to com- 
mercial or economic development in designated regions 
of the territories of China, or which might seek to create 
any such monopoly or preference as would exclude other 
nationals from undertaking any legitimate trade or 
industry, or from participating with the Chinese Gov- 
ernment in any category of public enterprise." 

It is not easy to reconcile either the text or the spirit 
of this statement with the language of the Lanslng- 
Ishii agreement, and it is certainly contrary to the im- 
port of that agreement as it has been interpreted in 



JAPAN AND THE TAR EAST CONFEEENCE 4S 

Japan. This illustrates one feature of our treatment 
of Oriental: affairs that has been extremely unfortunate, 
and has gone far in impairing the lasting character 
of our influence and our policies; for these have not 
been continuous or consistent. I need only mention the 
reversal by Mr. Wilson of the "dollar diplomacy" of 
Mr. Kjnox and the return by Mr. Wilson to a similar 
policy in his approval of the Consortium for the purpose 
of giving China financial assistance. 



JAPAN'S IMPERIALISM 

The Japanese are undoubtedly extending their sphere 
of influence on the Asiatic continent, notably in the 
Shantung Peninsula, Southern Manchuria and Eastern 
Siberia, and they are consolidating their power in Korea 
and Formosa. Japan insists that her motives are econo- 
mic ; that she is merely extending her trade, or seeking, 
by colonization and the investment of capital in industri- 
al development, to provide for that part of her popula- 
tion which is overflowing to the mainland, and to secure 
raw materials and food for her rapidly increasing peo- 
ple who remain at home. But it is asserted by Japan's 
critics that her Asiatic policy will lead to the dismem- 
berment of China ; and certainly, if that is Japan's pur- 
pose, China, unaided, would have small chance to avert 
such a fate. China is like a great slumbering giant, 
and the vital question of the Orient is how long the 
world will wait for her to awaken, and how long Japan 
can be restrained in her national aspirations, in order 
to let China catch up and create a balance of power, 
giving stability to both of the two great Oriental 
powers. No nation on earth has more interest in this 
question than the United States ; and it will undoubtedly 

44 



JAPAN AND THE, FAR EAST CONrERENCB 45 

engage the most careful consideration of the coming 
conference. 

One thing that should encourage us to believe that 
our attitude in the conference will influence the future 
policy of Japan is the rather recently developed soHci- 
tude of the Japanese people concerning the public opin- 
ion of the United States. It does not need a long so- 
journ in Japan, or much contact with her people, to 
discover that they are more anxious to know what we 
think of them than we are to concern ourselves with their 
national activities. The liberal element is particularly 
anxious to justify Japan in the eyes of the world for 
such measures as the occupation of Shantung and the 
annexation of Korea; and members of the so-called 
military party are themselves by no means indifferent. 
It results that the opportunity afforded to America as 
a great power on the Pacific to keep Japanese aspira- 
tions within reasonable bounds, was never better, in spite 
of the exacerbation temporarily caused by the Califor- 
nia situation. But will America deal wisely and con- 
sistently in the conference, and afterwards, with the 
Oriental situation? If its Eastern policy is to change 
with each administration so radically as it did when Mr. 
Wilson became President, it is not reasonably to be ex- 
pected that it will be very effective. Nor will a futile 
protest in the conference against a fait accompli like 
that of the Shantung provision of the treaty with Ger- 



46 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 

many have any useful result or improve the relations 
between the two countries. What is needed is a definite, 
well-rounded, consistent and continuous policy with ref- 
erence to Oriental matters. If such a policy can be 
adopted and formulated in conference, it will have enor- 
mous influence in shaping the destinies of the East. 

In the matter of potential military strength, if we 
leave out of account financial considerations, Japan is 
so powerful that she could probably subjugate all of 
the hundreds of millions of people living in China, Man- 
churia, Mongolia and Siberia. But fortunately for the 
rest of the world, Japan has advanced far enough in her 
grasp of modern world conditions to understand that 
an attempt at any such gigantic conquest would ulti- 
mately prove disastrous and that no modern nation 
could long endure should it undertake such an enter- 
prise against the protest of the family of world nations. 
And while she often exhibits a caution in her interna- 
tional relations which tends to excite suspicion as to her 
ulterior designs, Japan is at the present time peculiarly 
receptive of advice from the western nations and par- 
ticularly from the United States, in relation to her 
policy in the East. 

Under these circumstances what is the best policy for 
this country to pursue? Ought we not to participate 
with other powers in the conference in seeking to influ- 
ence Japan's policy in Eastern Asia? And in so doing 



JAPAN AND THE, FAR EAST CONFERENCE 47 

ought we not to approach Japan's problems sympathe- 
tically from her standpoint and not in a spirit which 
prejudges her case? 



OUR INTEREST IN DEAiLING WITH 
FAR EAST QUESTIONS 

Two thousand miles of our western sea-coast front 
the islands and the shores of Asia. By cable and wire- 
less we are in daily communication with all parts of the 
Orient. Fast steamers brings us no further from them 
than were Virginia and Massachusetts from each other 
for many years after our Revolution. We have ex- 
tended across the Pacific a chain of outposts com- 
mencing with Hawaii, passing through Guam and ex- 
tending to the Philippines. Our interests require that 
an open door in China should be maintained through 
which we may participate in and seek to develop trade 
among her millions. We have not hesitated both 
through diplomatic channels and through manifesta- 
tions of public opinion to let Oriental countries under- 
stand that as a nation we have an interest in such 
matters as the Shantung Peninsula, the twenty-one de- 
mands of Japan on China during the war, the economic 
concessions of China to Japan in Southern Manchuria, 
the occupation of Siberia, the recognition of a special 
interest on the part of Japan, on account of propin- 
quity, in the neighboring countries of Asia, the Con- 

4S 



JAPAN AND THE, FAR EAST CONFERENCE 49 

sortium, and the mandatory of the Island of Yap. It 
will hardly be contended that we have not clearly, if 
spasmodically, asserted our national interest in the 
political affairs of the Far East. It may be unfor- 
tunate, according to the way in which one looks at it ; 
but it remains the indisputable fact that our material 
and political interests in the East and the responsi- 
bilities which have been by fate thrown upon us, demand 
that our political relations with the countries of the 
Orient, and especially with Japan, should be made of 
the highest concern to the American nation. And from 
the standpoint of national idealism also American pub- 
lic opinion will no doubt continue to concern itself with 
Far Eastern Affairs. 

Although the United States is one of the most prac- 
tical and progressive nations of the world, it is equally 
true that it is the most idealistic. Instances illustrat- 
ing this are numerous. I need mention only a few, 
such as our refusal to take Cuba, our payment of 
$20,000,000 for the Philippines, which was not better 
than a liability, our attitude towards Mexico, our re- 
turn to China of the Boxer indemnity to be used by 
her for educational purposes, and to Japan of the Shi- 
moneseki award. However other nations may dislike 
us or criticize us, such things as these check any ten- 
dency to distrust our national motives. This national 
idealism not only gives us a growing interest, but also 



50 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFEEENCE 

a potent influence, in the development of civilization 
in the Far East. As I have said, the civilization which 
has reached its most perfected form among the western 
Christian nations, moves inevitably towards the west. 
In mid-Pacific the West becomes the East, and signs 
are not wanting that the influence of western civiliza- 
tion is slowly but surely making its impress upon the 
ancient and comparatively obsolescent civilization of 
the Far East. Aimerica cannot view with indifference 
a historical epoch having such significance for the up- 
lifting of humanity. 

Then too our trade situation with the Orient is of 
first rate importance. Our imports from Japan in 
1920 were half a billion dollars and were about equal 
to those from the United Kingdom and from Canada. 
They far exceeded those from any other of the chief 
countries of the world. Our exports to Japan were 
more than a half a billion dollars and were far in excess 
of those to any other of the great countries of the 
world, excepting France, the United Kingdom and 
Canada. Our trade with Japan is four times that with 
China, which has probably six or seven times the popu- 
lation of Japan. The maintenance of the commercial 
relations between the two countries having such com- 
mercial relations is clearly of very great importance. 



IMMIGRATION AND THE CALIFORNIA 
LAND QUESTION 

It is the reaction which has followed the assumption 
by America of racial superiority that has caused more 
irritation than many of the other questions, more im- 
portant to us, which have been the subject of interna- 
tional discussion. The Japanese have felt that they 
have not only been treated as inferior to Americans, 
but also to other people less advanced than they who 
are permitted to enter the United States under restric- 
tions milder than those imposed on them. There seems 
to be no expectation (or any very strong desire) on 
the part of Japan that we should change our Oriental 
exclusion policy. But there is a good deal of irrita- 
tion on account of the manner in which California has 
been recently dealing with the land question, in its effort 
to prevent Japanese residents of that state from ac- 
quiring agricultural lands. This question should not 
be confused with the general immigration exclusion 
policy of the United States, which is embodied in the 
"Gentlemen's Agreement," negotiated by Mr. Root, and 
which is faithfully observed by Japan. 

51 



52 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CON^FERENCE 

The Japanese are not a colonizing people — their love 
of their native land is too intense for that. Japan's 
statesmen seem to be willing at present to keep as many 
of her nationals as they can in the Archipelago or in 
Formosa or Korea, or, if they must be colonized, to 
send them, as they now are doing, to those other parts 
of Asia which are near at hand and are being developed 
with Japanese capital. 

But in California the effort has been to prevent 
Japanese who were permanent residents, although not 
citizens, from acquiring control, through leases or by 
transfer to their minor children, of agricultural lands. 
The legislation to accomplish this was based on initia- 
tive petitions, and the political agitation which it has 
aroused, was marked by exaggerated and inflamed 
statements concerning Japan and the Japanese. The 
new California land law was not directed in terms at 
the Japanese, but generally at persons who were not 
qualified to become citizens of the United States ; and 
under the citizenship laws of the United States as 
"white men and Africans" are eligible to citizenship but 
"Mongolians" were not mentioned, the Chinese and the 
Japanese are by implication excluded. It is this dis- 
crimination which operates to make the new California 
law apply to the Japanese ; and that, as I have said, is 
the chief cause of complaint on their part, and espec- 



JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 5S 

ially because they are thus treated as inferior to all 
"white men and Africans." 

It is urged that the effect of the California statute 
is to deny to the Japanese the equal protection of the 
law, in that it discriminates among different classes 
of aliens, conferring upon one the protection of the 
law which it denies to another. It is also claimed that 
the provisions are in violation of our treaty with Japan 
which provides that Japanese residing in this country 
"may own or hire and occupy houses, manufactories, 
warehouses, shops and premises, and lease land for resi- 
dential and commercial purposes." But I do not be- 
lieve that a satisfactory solution of our relations with 
Japan, so far as they are affected by the California 
land question, will be found in a decision upon a mere 
question of constitutional law. From the international 
standpoint the vital consideration is that a single state 
of the Union is insisting upon its own solution of a 
problem affecting its local, social and business inter- 
ests, and, in the words of Governor Stephens, "is very 
sensitive about any interference with or restraint upon 
the sovereign right of the State to deal with its domestic 
land problems." It has not so much concern as to the 
manner in which that solution may affect the interests 
of the country at large. 

It is this phase of the matter that ought to engage 
the attention of every American citizen. 



54 JAPAN AND THE FAE, EAST CONFERENCE 

I do not mean to be understood as saying that the 
position which the people of California have taken is 
not without justification, or that the Japanese who 
have settled in California are themselves without blame 
for the situation which has been created. The Japan- 
ese government might have anticipated, and perhaps 
have adopted measures to prevent, what has happened. 
The Japanese have selected a part of our country with 
a most salubrious climate and fertile land. They have 
made no effort to distribute themselves, and, with their 
prosperity and their increasing enjoyment of the ad- 
vantages afforded them by the protection of the state 
laws, they have not conformed their customs and man- 
ner of living to those prevailing in America. On the 
contrary, they have concentrated themselves in limited 
areas, which has resulted in the establishment of com- 
munities in which have been retained Japanese social, 
domestic and religious customs. This was sure, sooner 
or later, to result in prejudice and discrimination. 
Furthermore, by availing themselves of their rights 
under the letter of state statutes while ignoring their 
spirit they have invited new and discriminatory laws. 
Thus it is charged (I have no figures showing the ex- 
tent of the practice), that in order to evade the dis- 
ability as to land ownership, they have, under the legal- 
istically correct advice of California lawyers, pur- 
chased land and had it conveyed to their minor chil- 



JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 55 

dren. They have then been appointed guardians of 
these children, thus becoming the practical owners of 
land they could not buy themselves. They have also 
formed corporations qualified under the California law 
to acquire title to land and have become the sole stock- 
holders. By such methods as these they have been en- 
abled lawfully to enjoy the benefits of land ownership, 
in spite of laws which were designed to prevent pre- 
cisely that result. This procedure was certain to bring 
reprisals. If there is discrimination, the Japanese 
government and the Japanese people, in dealing with 
the question as an international matter, ought not to 
overlook these antecedent conditions. 

I would not adequately deal with this phase of the 
subject if I did not observe that subjectively the Japan- 
ese are more intensely nationalistic than any other na- 
tion on earth, with the possible exception of France. 
In their feelings for their nationals who are settled 
in other countries, the psychology of the Japanese 
people diifers from that of the American people. 
They seem to be attached to the interests of their fel- 
low countrymen wherever they are, and they are keenly 
sensitive to any affront offered to them by foreign na- 
tions. We Americans, on the other hand, have com- 
paratively little experience with American citizens who 
emigrate to other countries. The comparatively few 
who have gone to such countries as Mexico and the 



56 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 

Orient have well understood that they would be expect- 
ed to conform to the laws and customs of the countries 
to which they emigrate, and that our government would 
not lightly interfere to protect their interests. We do 
not quite understand how an American citizen can re- 
concile himself to permanently leaving his native coun- 
try or becoming naturalized in a foreign land. It is 
a little difficult, therefore, for us to realize the intensity 
of feeling which has been aroused in Japan on account 
of the rights of Japanese citizens who are seeking the 
protection and advantages to be enjoyed under a for- 
eign government. I mention this matter merely to 
show that the viewpoint of the two nations is, if not 
irreconcilable, at least such as to require it to be dealt 
with with some delicacy. 

It is undoubtedly true that the amount of land in 
California owned and worked by the Japanese is not 
large in comparison with the entire area of cultivable 
land in the State. Of 27,931,444 acres of farm land, 
the Japanese own 74,769 acres and lease 383,287 ; and 
the average farm in California is approximately 320 
acres, while the farms of the Japanese average only 56 
acres. The total of farm products in California, ac- 
cording to a report of Governor Stephens, was valued 
at $507,811,881, to which the Japanese contributed 
$67,145,730 or 13%. The Japanese produce 80% to 
92i% of certain products, like berries, celery and as- 



JAPAN AND THEi FAR EAST CONFERENCE 57 

paragus, and the American farmers monopolize such 
products as hay, grain, potatoes, grapes, beans, rice, 
cotton, corn, fruits and nuts. But these comparisons 
do not quite present the concrete conditions; for the 
Japanese colonize in districts of limited area, notably 
the Sacramento Valley, and there by their industry, 
their economy and their frugal habits, they soon drive 
out the neighboring American farmers, who are unable 
to sustain the competition, largely because their stand- 
ards of living materially differ from those of the Jap- 
anese. 

But there is no doubt that in these and other mat- 
ters gross exaggeration has caused groundless fears. 
I noticed an example of this in a recent article in the 
World^s WorJcy where a writer comments upon the fact 
that, after the "Gentlemen's Agreement" in 1907, un- 
der which the Japanese agreed to discontinue the grant- 
ing of passports to laboring classes, the number of 
Japanese arrivals fell from more than 30,000 in 1907 
to less than 4,000 in 1909, but that after that they 
largely increased until in 1919 they numbered more 
than 16,000. But it is not stated that the 30,000 im- 
migrants in 1907 included about 20,000 who went to 
Hawaii. The writer exhibits a table showing that the 
aggregate arrivals since 1908 have been about 120,000. 
If these were added to the Japanese population ac- 
cording to the census of 1910, which was about 40,000, 



58 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 

the present Japanese population would be 160,000. As 
a matter of fact, however, the census which was re- 
cently completed shows that the Japanese population 
of California is 70,196, an increase of only g8,840 or 
69.7% since 1910. Perhaps the writer in the World's 
Work did not intend to have the deduction made that 
all of the arrivals went to increase the resident Japan- 
ese population, but from his figures an uninformed 
reader would probably arrive at that conclusion. The 
fact is, however, that in the period mentioned in the 
World's Work the figures given include arrivals in 
Hawaii, and the departures are not deducted. The fig- 
ures for arrivals, therefore, show only one side of the 
account, and do not represent the net result of immi- 
gration into continental United States. These facts 
render the tabulation of the writer in World's Work 
of little value in determining whether the increase in 
the Japanese population in California is so great as 
to give just cause for apprehension. The figures of 
the recent census show that California now has a popu- 
lation of 3,426,861 and a Japanese population of 
70,196, or about 2%. In 1910 it was 1.7%. The rate 
of increase, being l/30th of 1% per year, is not 
alarming. Furthermore, it appears that a very large 
part of the increase of the Japanese population con- 
sisted of women, no doubt many of them "Picture 



JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 59 

Brides," brought to this country to establish the fam- 
ilies of the farmers who preceded them. 

But, however exaggerated statements made in the 
heat of the recent political campaign in California may- 
have been, the question is a real one to the Californians 
and the situation created in certain locahties ought to 
be dealt with in justice to the citizens of the state. The 
Japanese are not seeking to abandon the "Gentlemen's 
Agreement" of 1907, or to have the bars against Orien- 
tal immigration lowered. But they are restive because 
they are not treated like other nations of the world, 
however backward the people of such nations may be. 
This complaint may be removed if our immigration 
laws are put upon a more scientific basis. The neces- 
sity for this has been pressed upon us by the impend- 
ing danger that we may be flooded by immigrants from 
Southern Europe and the Near East. The new Immi- 
gration Law I hope may be an opening wedge to a bet- 
ter condition. It is based on the principle that the 
number of immigrants allowed to enter shall be made 
dependent upon the abiHty of our country to absorb, 
assimilate and Americanize them, without undue dis- 
turbance of our social and industrial conditions. 

Probably the conference called by President Harding 
will not deal with the California question. I wish it 
might. But Japan's participation and the considera- 



60 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 

tion shown to her unquestioned position as one of the 
powers of the world will certainly have a good effect. 

In an article published in Current Opinion last win- 
ter I wrote as follows : 

"I hope the pending diplomatic negotiations may 
contribute something to restore cordial feeling between 
the two nations. If these fail, however, the suggestion 
is worthy of consideration, that there be appointed an 
international commission which will attempt to find a 
solution of the troublesome question, having regard for 
Japan's national pride, for the vital interests of Cali- 
fornia, and for the rights of the entire American peo- 
ple. Objections having force have been made to such 
a commission. But the controlling consideration in its 
favor, in my judgment, is that in no other way than 
by the report of an international body composed of 
eminent men, in whose membership California is rep- 
resented, can a conclusion be arrived at which will have 
the necessary weight with both the people of California 
and the people of Japan. 

"So far as the general subject of immigration is 
concerned, that, of course, may be dealt with from the 
national standpoint, but the ownership and leasing of 
land is a matter usually regulated by state laws, and 
when national action is proposed, the interests of the 
state must not only be considered but the people of the 
state must be assured that their interests have received 



JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 61 

from an impartial body the attention which they de- 
serve. It would, in my opinion, be within the compet- 
ency of the treaty-making power of the United States 
to enter into a treaty with Japan which would render 
null and void a provision of the California statutes, or 
even of its constitution, with which it was in conflict, 
for the Constitution of the United States provides that 
treaties of the United States are to be ^the supreme 
law of the land.' But the national government has al- 
ways hesitated to deal with the rights of states by the 
exercise of the treaty-making power, and it probably 
will not attempt to do so in the case of California." 



SHAiNTUNG 

Another matter which will undoubtedly engage the 
attention of the conference called by President Hard- 
ing is the Shantung question. When I was in Japan 
about a year and a half ago the public men of that 
country were inclined, as I have already said, to take 
the position that so far as America was concerned 
there was no Shantung question — that it was settled 
by the provision of the Treaty of Versailles under 
which Japan succeeded to the rights of Germany in the 
Shantung Peninsula. But Japanese statesmen were 
quite willing to state Japan's position so far as it re- 
lated to China. 

The Shantung province has a population of thirty 
millions. It contains the grave of Confucius, which 
sanctifies its territory. On the sea-coast the district 
of Kiao Chau, formerly occupied by the Germans, 
occupies a territory of about twenty square miles. 
Tsing Tau, the city within that district, became dur- 
ing the German occupation a beautiful modern city. 
Japan occupied Shantung for the purpose of organ- 
izing its campaign against the German forces in Kiao 
Chau and Tsing Tau. After the capture of these 
places, the military occupation of the country con- 

62 



JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE K}0 

tinued, and the Japanese forces policed the railroad 
running from Tsing Tau to Tsinan-Fu, the capital 
of the province, a distance of 170 miles. Up to a 
certain time the occupation of the Shantung province 
was undoubtedly a justifiable incident of the war. It 
took place when the Allies were only too glad to avail 
themselves of the efforts of Japan to destroy the mili- 
tary power of Germany in the East. As the war drew 
to a close, however, the question of Japan's withdrawal 
from the Shantung province came up sharply for dis- 
cussion, and particularly in connection with the nego- 
tiations at Paris which resulted in the Versailles Treaty. 
If Japan had not given her assurance to the allied 
nations that her occupation of Shantung would not be 
made the basis for an interference with the political 
independence of China within that province, Articles 
15^, 157 and 158 of the Treaty of Versailles, relating 
to Shantung, would probably not have been adopted. 
But Japan agreed to refrain from interference with 
the political autonomy of the Shantung province, and 
also at a convenient season to enter into negotiations 
with China for a settlement of the Kiao Chau situa- 
tion and of the claims to the economic concessions in 
Shantung which had been made to Germany. Sufficient 
evidence of this agreement is afforded by President 
Wilson's statement to the Senate Committee that he 
had an understanding with the Japanese delegates in 



64< JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 

Paris "that Japan should return to China in full sov- 
ereignty the old province of Shantung so far as Ger- 
many had any claims upon it, preserving to herself the 
right to estabhsh a residential district at Tsing Tau, 
which is the town of Kiao Chau Bay ; that with regard 
to the railways and mines she should retain only the 
rights of an economic concession there with the right, 
however, to maintain a special body of police on the 
railway, the personnel of which should be Chinese un- 
der Japanese instructors nominated by the managers 
of the company and appointed by the Chinese govern- 
ment." 

Since the Peace Conference, there has been ample 
evidence of the willingness of the Japanese government 
to carry out promptly this agreement. Viscount Uchida, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and Prime 
Minister Hara, have made unequivocal statements that 
it is the intention of Japan to make good the promises 
of their Peace Commissioners ; and the Japanese For- 
eign Office has made repeated efforts to open negotia- 
tions with the Peking government, with a view to mak- 
ing the complicated arrangements incident to the with- 
drawal from Shantung of Japanese troops which have 
been maintained there, as the Japanese continue to as- 
sert, for police purposes. What these difficulties will 
be is foreshadowed in a dispatch from Geneva dated 
December 9th, 1920, in which Baron Hayaslii, the head 



JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 65 

of the Japanese delegation to the Assembly of the 
League of Nations, is said to have repeated the assur- 
ances given by the Prime Minister and the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, and, after commenting upon the 
weakness of the Chinese government, to have added : 

"We must settle how it shall be open and what guar- 
antees we get that it remains so. Just the other day, 
for instance, one of the free ports of China was burnt 
by mutinous soldiers. We must have protection against 
that. . . . 

"What they call public opinion is often that of 
school boys, traders and newspapers. It is often arti- 
ficial. It always urges the Government to stand firm 
and does not consider the consequences. ... 

"I say it is difficult for us to deal with China. We 
see here a bright young man, Wellington Koo. He is 
a nice boy, but when he goes home he has no power. 
The Parliament behind him has no power. The army 
is revolting and half the fleet has joined the rebels. 
How can we make an enduring treaty with a Govern- 
ment like that? 

"China needs a strong man. We wish she could get 
one to set her in order. Then we could negotiate and 
give back Kiao Chau, which we intend to do, but first 
we must have guarantees. Who can give them to us 
today.?" 

The Peking government quite obviously hopes that 



66 ■ JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 

the League of Nations, and perhaps the coming con- 
ference, will enforce some solution of the entire ques- 
tion which will be more favorable to Chinese interests 
and more satisfactory to the Chinese people than would 
have been possible if the concessions to Germany had 
remained in effect. The Chinese delegates to Paris 
sought not only to curtail Japan's political and mili- 
tary control in Shantung but also to recover the prov- 
ince freed of all claims based upon the concessions to 
Germany, as well as of all economic rights claimed by 
Japan as compensation for her services in destroying 
the German power in the East. In her last official note 
to China on the subject, Japan expressed her willing- 
ness to arrange the details of a settlement at any time 
that China might be ready and urged China to expedite 
the organization of a police force on the Shantung 
railroad so that Japan might safely withdraw her 
troops. After a long delay, an entirely inconclusive 
reply was made by China, to the effect that "the people 
throughout China have assumed an indignantly antag- 
onistic attitude toward the question. For these reasons, 
and also in consideration of the amity existing between 
Japan and China, the Chinese government does not find 
itself in a position to reply at this moment."* But the 



*NOTE: — ^Since this book went to press the Chinese govern- 
ment lias informally handed to the Japanese Minister in this 
country a note whicli for the first time since the Shantung con- 
travers]^ arose, states China's attitude. (Dispatch from Peking, 



JAPAN AND THE' FAR EAST CONFERENCE 67 

promises of the Japanese government have been so plaiB 
and unconditional, and have so pledged the nation to 
the United States and to other nations of the world, 
that they amount to an assurance which Japan could 
not and would not withdraw. The influence of the 
United States at the coming conference ought to be 



published in the New York Times of October 8, 1931.) The delay 
in negotiating with Japan is explained in the note as resulting 
from the fact that "the bases Japan claims to negotiate are all 
of a nature most objectionable to the Chinese Government and 
the Chinese people, or are such which they never have recognized. 
Furthermore, regarding the Shantung question, although Japan 
has made many vague declarations, she has actually had no plan 
which was fundamentally acceptable. Therefore the case has 
pended many years, much to China's expectation to the contrary." 

As to the most recent proposals of Japan the note continues 
that if they "are to be regarded as Japan's final concessions, they 
surely inadequately prove the sincerity of Japan's desire to settle 
iiie question." 

The note ignores the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, to 
which China finally became one of the signatories. It also rejects 
Japan's proposal for a unified railway system in Shantung and 
for the operation of the joint mines appurtenant to the railway. 
It is insisted that the Japanese army of occupation should be 
immediately evacuated, and that "China will immediately seed 
a suitable force of Chinese railway police to" protect the railway. 

The note concludes as follows: 

"Further, in view of the marked difference of opinion between 
the two countries, and apprehending that the case might long 
remain unsettled, China reserves to herself the freedom of seeking 
a solution of the question whenever a suitable occasion presents 
itself." 

Precisely what this cryptic statement implies one can only con- 
jecture. China has not presented her case to the Council of the 
League of Nations, or attempted to procure an amendment of 
the Treaty of Versailles. Perhaps her diplomacy perceives tiiat 
if the Shantung question is considered at the coming conference 
in Washington the Chinese government's continued refusal to 
make some definite response to Japan's advances may prejudice 
her case. 



68 JAPAM AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 

exerted to induce China to enter into a negotiation for 
the friendly settlement of the Shantung question. 
China can safely do this for it is quite certain that the 
public opinion of the world would not tolerate any over- 
reaching by Japan or any settlement which would in- 
volve an undue encroachment upon China's sovereignty 
in the Shantung Peninsula outside of the Kiao Chau 
district. Even within that district only such arrange- 
ments for the protection of Japanese interests will be 
sanctioned as are recognized by the principal allied 
«^nd associated nations and the world as reasonable 
under the circumstances. Neither the Council of the 
League nor the conference can act except by unanimous 
vote; and insistence by China upon terms unsatisfac- 
tory to Japan would result in Japan's negative vote 
and the continuance of the existing status in the Shan- 
tung Peninsula. However unsatisfactory that status 
may be to China, it has a basis of legality in Articles 
156, 157 and 158, which make Japan the legitimate 
successor of Germany in the peninsula. It is to be 
hoped that neither the Council nor the conference may 
have to act (or refuse to act), but that an arrange- 
ment satisfactory to the delegates of both China and 
Japan may be arrived at, and that the unanimous judg- 
ment of the Council of the League, or of the coming 
conference, based on such arrangement, may enable the 
Peking government to obtain approval in China which 



JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 69 

would be withheld from any agreement made by the 
impotent Peking government as a result of an ordin- 
ary diplomatic negotiation with Japan. But if the 
Chinese delegates, against the protest of Japan, at- 
tempt to obtain support for China in repudiating the 
succession of Japan to the rights of Germany, under 
Articles 156, 157 and 158 of the Versailles Treaty of 
Peace, and the several agreements made between China 
and Japan during the war, on the ground that they 
were exacted from China by coercion, because China 
was powerless to defend herself against a possible in- 
vasion through Siberia, and Japan was the only nation 
in the East which could successfully destroy German 
power in Shantung and on the seas, a field of contro- 
versy will be opened up the consequences of which no 
man can predict. Such an attitude on the part of 
China, if supported by the League or the conference, 
would necessarily require the nations especially inter- 
ested in Oriental affairs to inaugurate some kind of 
an effective policy by which the solidarity of Chinese 
territory and the independence of its government should 
be maintained. That would involve an intervention 
which would be a grave undertaking. 

But China is patient. It has certain weapons which 
it can use effectively. Passive resistance with the 
Chinaman is a spontaneous art. A commercial boy- 
cott is even now being used with great effect as a re« 



70 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 

prisal for the action of Japan in proposing the twenty- 
one articles and retaining its hold upon the Shantung 
Peninsula. The strength of such a weapon as this 
cannot be ignored; and the spirit and enthusiasm and 
patriotism of the enlightened Chinaman must also have 
their effect. But can all these forces be marshalled in 
time to avoid the pressure of Japanese civilization and 
the resulting disintegration of China.? A solution by 
the conference of this question will not be found un- 
less it deals with Oriental, and especially with Japan- 
ese, affairs, with a sympathetic view of the national 
necessities created by the growth of Japan's popula- 
tion, and with an intelligent conception of her national 
aspirations ; and closer attention must be continuously 
given to the conditions which from time to time exist 
in the Orient than has been possible in the past. 



THE IMPROBABILITY OF WAR 

Unfortunately, there is an appreciable number of 
Americans both in this country and in Japan who be- 
lieve that war between the two countries is inevitable, 
and they point to certain preparations in Japan as 
indicating an aggressive policy on her part. But such 
investigation of these matters as I was able to make 
lead me to the conclusion that the preparations referred 
to were defensive in character and were no more elab- 
orate than the exposed position of Japan in the Pacific 
Ocean made reasonably necessary. There is no party 
in Japan which, from the standpoint either of inclina- 
tion or of national policy, seriously contemplates war 
with America. All organized political parties seem to 
agree that the cultivation of cordial relations with this 
country is the best pubHc policy for Japan. In this 
connection the words of Mr. Roosevelt uttered in July, 
1918, come back to me. He said : 

"Japan is playing a great part in the civilized 
world ; a good understanding between her and the 
the United States is essential to the international 
progress, and it is a grave offense against the 
United States for any man by word or deed to 
jeopardize this good understanding." 

71 



72 JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST CONFERENCE 

Japan is becoming more and more a democratic na- 
tion. The manhood franchise has been greatly extend- 
ed. The interest of the people in public affairs is ob- 
vious to even a casual observer. On May 11th, 1920, I 
was a witness to a manifestation of such interest in 
Kobe, which I have already referred to. In perhaps 
a dozen places in that city I saw crowds obstructing 
the streets where bulletin boards were displayed show- 
ing the returns of the election the day before to the 
Diet — the lower house of the National legislature. 
Such political consciousness as this indicates is reflected 
in the Japanese press whose wide circulation shows a 
demand for detailed news items and such free comment 
upon public affairs as fill their columns. It is not 
improbable that the mass of the people are taking a 
growing interest in politics as they are in industrial 
affairs ; and as 95 per cent, of them are literate it is 
not probable that this interest will abate. Now, the 
common people of Japan do not want war. They are 
intensely occupied with their internal affairs ; and I 
am satisfied that this attitude will go far to neutralize 
the belligerent feeling that may exist among those who 
still adhere to the militaristic policy, and particularly 
the young and enthusiastic army and navy officers look- 
ing for a career. 

The fact, already alluded to, that under the Japan- 
ese form of government the ministers of war and of 



JAPAN AND THE FAB, EAST CONFERENCE 73 

the navy are not removable as a result of changes of 
political administration, and are thus to some extent 
beyond the reach of public opinion, will not probably 
long prevent the evolution of a liberal policy under 
which the militaristic influences in governmental ad- 
ministration will be gradually diminished. This will 
also naturally curb imperialistic ambition for the ac- 
quisition of territory, particularly on the Asiatic con- 
tinent. 



J 



NECESSITY FOR TERRITORIAL EXPANSION 

But all this is not to say that Japan will not some 
time extend her territorial possessions, if that becomes 
necessary to satisfy her national needs, particularly in 
feeding and clothing her people and in obtaining raw 
materials which are required in her essential industries. 
If China, America and the western powers who have an 
.interest in Oriental affairs, refuse to recognize these 
needs, Japan will, despite all objections, be driven to 
supplying them. The most ordinary considerations 
of prudence require that she should protect her people 
against the evils of overcrowding her already densely 
populated islands. That she wishes to accomplish that 
result by dismembering China is by no means clear, 
but that she seeks to obtain an economic foothold in 
Manchuria, Mongolia, Shantung and perhaps Siberia, 
as a means of procuring raw materials, and that she 
will encourage her people to emigrate to those coun- 
tries, is not only probable but seemingly justifiable. 
If this aspect of the situation is dealt with by the com- 
ing conference sympathetically from the viewpoint of 
Japan's national necessities, a settlement of pending 
Asiatic questions will become more simple, particularly 
as never before has Japan been so sensitive to adverse 

74 



JAPAN AND THE FAE EAST CONFERENCE 75 

criticism of her imperialistic tendencies as she is now. 
The friendly intervention of America in these matters 
would not be resented ; and we occupy a position which 
would enable us by intervening to be of substantial 
service to civilization in eliminating possible causes of 
international trouble in the Orient. 



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